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PREFATORY WOTS*
The theme of th&a thesis was suggested to the writer by a
study of the election map of 1916*

The issues of the campaign

were so numerous, and the predilections of yoters
individual questions

on the

were so variously assorted, that it was

difficult to find considerable groups of voters r/ho agreed with
each other throughout.
Wilson and Hughes

Accordingly, their decision as between

could be made only by balancing a great

number of alternatives.

Why Ohio should be the notable

exception in a group of states that were carried by Hughes,
necessitated a study of what features appealed

most to the

individual groups of the Ohio electorate, since it is evident
that the answer

cannot be found in any one cause, but must be

sought in some deep underlying principle.

The solution offered

may meet with objection; but, as it has not, as far as the writer
knows, been suggested by anyone else, he invites consideration of
it as probably more satisfactory than the conventional explanations
that have been offered hitherto.
The m

m

sources of information on which the theory is

based, in addition to standard historical works, statistics, and
the periodical literature
newspapers

of the time, consist of the files of

of 1916, letters from men prominent in the campaign,

and replies to a questionnaire addressed to those who had charge
of the campaign in the several counties.

Conversations with a few

political leaders who preferred to remain unnamed, gave color to
the investigation, and called the writer's attention
statements

to published

whose significance might otherwise have been overlooked

T:i& xlilSSI D ?IAii CAiiPAISii OF 1916 lii OHIO.
Tha Presidential Campaign of 1916 was remarkable in that,
although Wilson fcad a plurality of 530f0o0 over Hughes through*
out the nation, a change of lass than 2000 votes in California
would have given Hughes the presidency. (1)

Hughes would

(1) "The election had jbeen saved by a margin of one-third of
one per cent of the votes cast in a single state”. Ggg,
j?‘. A.# National Progress, p. 330,
^ee also Review of
Reviews, i>eo. 1916, p. 633.
have gone into office knowing that a plurality of over half a
million preferred his opponent.

Under those circumstances, the

question of why any state voted as it did seems trivial.

She

fact that California reported last, and that the presidency
was in doubt until that report was in, gave the voice of Cali
fornia an importance that it did not deserve,

oinoe '/ilson’a

majority in the electoral college was 23, why could not any
other state

that cast twelve or mor9 electoral votes for V/ilson

be considered the deciding state?

*Ihe five Northwestern States,

Washington, Idaho, Montana, North Dakota, and Wyoming, usually
Republican, cast 23 electoral votes for Wilson.

*Vith as good

reason it could bo said that they decided the election.

Hughes

carried only four states west of the »iiscls3lppl, while <«ils,on
carried 18.

California in voting for Wilson was only keeping

step with her neighbors.

ohio, on the other hand, was not keeping

step with her neighbors,

vhio was the ihissing link in a chain

of states extending from Massachusetts to South Jakota that oast

2/
their votes for Hughes.

The secret of Wilson’s victory, then,

must be found in the reasons that put Ohio into, the democratic
column.
The initial difficulty that confronted the Republican man
agement at the beginning of 1916 was the fact that the democrats
were in control of the government.

The party in power has the

advantage of being able to force or change the issues
campaign is in progress.

while the

With Congress in session during the

summer, and the democrats in control of both the Capitol and
the White House, it lay in their power to enact into law any
demand of the Republican platform that might seem politic, and
thus to deprive their opponents

of a cause for criticism.

The problem before the Republican management was to get back
into the Republican fold the millions of .Progressives who had
left the party in 1912.

That secession had made a gift of the

presidency to the democratic Party.

The revolt was not &

momentary outburst of dissatisfaction, but the culmination of a
conflict that had been going on for years between! the Standpatters
of the East and the Insurgents of the West.

However, there were

also many Progressives in the East, and in fact Roosevelt oarried
Pennsylvania.

In the election of 1912 Wilson had received over

6.000. 000 votes, about 42$ of the total.

Roosevelt polled over

4.000. 000 votes, and Taft nearly 3,500,000; the two together about
51$ of the total vote.

The high-handed methods used in the re

nomination of the unpopular Taft was decisively rebuked by those
who felt that Rppsevelt should have had the nomination.

Wilson

entered upon the presidency with a Senate democratic by a bare

3/
majority, and with a House containing 291 Democrats and 144
Republicans and Progressives.
The congressional election of 1914 raised the Democratic
majority in the Senate to 16, but reduced the Democratic majority
in the House from 147 to 29.

About 2 f0O„f0C0 Progressives of

1912 returned to the Republican fold, while many others Joined
the Democratic Party.

.The task of the Republican managers was

to induce as many as possible of those who remained out, to vote
the Republican ticket in 1916.

Naturally, those who had remained

out so long were the hardest to reconcile.

They wanted Hoosevelt

for president, while the Eastern Republicans wanted a conservative
like -^lihu Root.
The leaders of the Republican and Progressive Parties arranged
that the national Conventions of the two parties should be held in
Chicago, at the same time, with the hope of making a merger.

But

negotiations proved futile, and the Progressives at length nomin
ated Roosevelt.

The Republicans nominated Associate. .Justice Chas.

3. Hughes of the Supreme Court, as a candidate who might reconcile
party factions.

He had not been involved in the fight of recent

years; he was considered conservative enough to hold the Hastera
vote, while it was hoped that his record as a reform governor of
flew York would be attractive enough
secure their support.

to Eastern Progressives to

Roosevelt refused to accept fcne ^regressive

nomination until Hughes should make a statement defining his
attitude on the vital questions of the day.

Wien this statement

was forthcoming, Roosevelt declared himself satisfied with it,
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majority, and with a House containing £91 Democrats and 144
Republicans and Progressives.
The congressional election of 1914 raised the Democratic
majority in the Senate to 16, but reduced the Democratic majority
in the House from 147 to 29.

About 2 f00~,000 Progressives of

1912 returned to the Republican fold, while many others Joined
the Democratic Party.

. The task of the Republican managers was

to induce as many as possible of those who remained out, to vote
the Republican ticket in 1916.

Haturally, those who had remained

out so long were the hardest to reconcile.

They wanted Hoosevelt

for president, while the Eastern Republicans '//anted a conservative
like -ilihu Root.
The leaders of the Republican and .Progressive Parties arranged
that the national Conventions of the two parties should be held in
Chicago, at the same time, with the hope of making a merger.

But

negotiations proved futile, and the Progressives at length nomin
ated Roosevelt.

The Republicans nominated Associate. Justice Chas.

3. Hughes of the Supreme Court, a3 a candidate who might reconcile
party factions.

He had not been involved in the fight of recent

yearsj he was considered conservative enough to hold the Eastern
vote, while it was hoped that his record as a reform governor of
New York would be attractive enough
secure their support.

to Western Progressives to

Roosevelt refused to accept fcno -^regressive

nomination until Hughes should make a statement defining his
attitude on the vital questions of the day.

*hen this statement

was forthcoming, Roosevelt declared himself satisfied with it,

*1
declined the Progressive nomination, and urged his followers to
support Hughes,

Most of them did so,

A remnant made a vain

effort to maintain the party organization, but disappeared from
party history with the close of this campaign.
effort was made to

In Ohio, no

continue the party organisation in 1916.

The democratic National Convention renominated President
Wilson, in a meeting taken up mostly with laudation of the
accomplishments of the current administration.
The platforms of the two parties for 1916

agreed in favoring

Woman’s Suffrage, the establishment of a Tariff Commission,
Conservation, maintenance of the Monroe doctrine, the Child
Labor Law, and Preparedness,

Naturally, the democratic

Platform praised the administration of President Wilson, while
the Republican rlatform criticised it severely.

The democrats

favored a tariff for revenue only, ultimate independence for the

*
Philippines, the establishment of a Federal Trade Commission,
and a government-owned and operated merchant marine.

The

Republicans favored a protective tariff, retention of the Phil
ippines, supervision and regulation of the great corporations,
federal control of transportation systems, and subsidies to a
private-owned merchant marine.

The Democratic Platform endorsed

the policy of the administration as regards Mexico and the *orld
Aar; while the Republicans criticised it as weak, inefficient,
and blundering,

Hughes made several speaking tours across the

country, while Wilson for the most part remained at his summer
home, Shadow Lawn, Hew Jersey.

8/
The campaign wore on through the summer without excitement,
broken only by the threat of a great railway strike, on the
part of the engineers, firemen, conductors, and brakemen.
The strike was averted by President Wilson’s forcing through
Congress the Adamson 8-hour law (Sept, 1 and 2); but, what was
more important from a political point of view, it livened up
the campaign, which had been rather listless hitherto, by
providing a specific and concrete issue to talk about.
Meanwhile the State campaign in Ohio was under way.
regular State Primary was held August 8th.

The

Ex-Governor James

M. Cox was nominated for governor by the Democrats.

He had

been elected in 1912, running 16,000 votes ahead of Wilson;
and had carried on a vigorous administration, though severely
criticised by his political opponents.

In 19i4, running for

re-election, though adding 54,000 to his former frote, he was
defeated by 31,000, by the Republican candidate, Frank B.
Willis, who garnered most of the Progressives of 1912. (1)

(1)

Report of Secretary of State (of Ohio): Ohio Statistics,1917,
p • 237.

Governor Willis was nominated for a second term by a large majority.
For United States Senator, the Democrats renominated Senator Atlee
Pomerene, while the Republicans nominated Ex-Governor Myron T.
Herrick.

Willis had proved a good governor, but the spoilsmen

complained that not enough offices had been passed around; and he
7/as handicapped by defective newspaper support.

(2 )

6/
SOT’S to preceding p a g e — Interview with political workers
oi 1916 intimate that the v/ithdrawal of newspapers to Co x ’s
side was due to political finesse on the part of the democratic
managers.
Possibly the fact that Cox himself was a newspaper
man had something to do with this.

The state issues concerned themselves with tax reform and
economy in expenditures, the candidates comparing records of
their administrations in these respects.

The prohibition

question formed a oackground, .Villis having mainly the support
of the drys.
Willis. depended upon the straight v.oter to carry him
through, it being expected that Hughes would carry the state
without a douot; and to this end the holswitt haw had boen
enacted, wnich recombinea Atate and national tickets on the
sans ballot.

3ut such a weapon cut 3 both ways; and, in the

end, it was Wilson'-a great*majority that carried Cox through.
If there had seen a separate ballot for the estate ticket,
thus necessitating separate marxing, .«iliis yvould most erobhave
ably |defeated Cos decisively. (1)
As it was, while *ilson

(1) Opinion of A. J. Kirstius, Chairman of the Hepuolican
Executive Committee of Cuyahoga County. Tne figures show
that 41,000 voters voted a mixed ticicet. If 41,wo0 out of
1,1 j o ,uCw voted a mixed ticket when it was more convenient
to YOte straight, it seems plausible tnat 4 jv>u more would
have done so if the ballots had been separate.

carried the state by 89,-do, Cox defeated

-'iliis by only 6 ^ u ,

The same circumstances may have operated to defeat Herrick for
tr.e senatorsnip, since lie v/as deieated oy oxijjy
million votes, about one-thirtieth, or u^-.e v.noxe•

oiiu of a

7/
Some time a county and city politics have a bearing upon the
election or defeat of a state candidate, as in Ohio in 1918,
when Cox again defeated Willis for the governorship, because
iVillis was too "dry” to suit Cincinnati and Hamilton County,
ordinarily a great stronghold of Republicanism. (1)

No such

(1) Hamilton County, normally 15,000 Republican during those
years, gave Cox 16,uOG majority in 1918.
villis lost the state
by only 12,j j O# Willis’s majority outside of Hamilton County
was 4UG0«
World Almanac, 1919.

causes were operative in Ohio in 1916.

The national election

was decided on national issues, and the state election on state
issues.
In the national campaign, it fell to the Democrats, as the.
party in power, to defend their administration and "pdint with
pride” to their achievements.

Ohio was early recognized as a

crucial state, and both sides made strenuous efforts to bring
their arguments to the ear of the hesitant and doubtful voter.
Never since the founding of the Republican Party in 1854 had
Ohio cast a majority of her votes for a Democratic presidential
candidate.

The Republicans had never had a walkover, however,

but had always had to fight for what they got.
Ohio early ranged herself with the Republican rarty on the
question of slavery, and the impetus of that question kept the
State in the Republican Party for 58 years, though Democratic
governors were elected frequently.

This stedfastnasa was to

8/
be expected as long as Ohio was predominantly an agricultural
Btate, since farmers as a olas3 are not prone to change.

(1)

(1) Some rural oountles are Republican and some are democratic,
with no apparent reason for the variation; for example, Belmont
County, Republican, and Uonroe County democratic. Probably it is
an inheritance from the early settlers of each county.

But latterly Ohio had been turning into an industrial state, with
large manufacturing interests and correspondingly large city pop(

illations.

2)

It was to be expected that this new element would soon

make new demands upon the government; and if the Republican Party
did not formulate a program of sooial and economio reform, they
might expect to see the voters leaving them and talcing up with a
more complaisant party.
This trend first showed itself in a tendency to eleot Demooratio governors. Coupled with this was the fact that the la*
boring class of the cities were in favor of the liqtor traffic
to a larger extent than the rural districts were; and the dem
ocrats were willing to cater to this desire, veiling their
attitude by stating that they were"opposed to sumptuary legislation".
The Republican* also were afraid to take a decided stand on the
liquor question, since in order to win they must antagonize
neither the dry rural counties nor wet Cincinnati, which had
aiways been a Republican stronghold.

The net result waB that

Ohio developed a school of politicians, both Republican and
Democratic, who were adepts at carrying water on one shoulder
and liquor on the other.

In the three gubernatorial campaigns

(2) Pershing, 3. H*, "Some Aspects of the 'Industrialization
oE Ohio", in Jhio Social Science Journal,Vol.I,No.4,Nov.,19£9#

9/
in which Cox and Willis opposed each other, the wet and dry
question constantly loomed up as an embarrassment to both
candidates.
While parties always formulate platforms and profess great
regard for the principles and policies enunciated in them, it
frequently happens that the candidate is more powerful than the
platform, and in fact becomes his own platform*
in 1916.

And so it was

The personalities of the candidates, Wilson and Hughes,

soon relegated the platforms to the background, especially since
they had been constructed mainly to draw rotes without offending
any group of voters.
Woodrow Wilson, after many years of teaching and several years
as President of Princeton University, had been drafted as Demooratlo candidate for governor of Hew Jersey, to rescue the state
from machine rule.

(1)

He entered offloe under no obligations

(1). Charles Seymour, WOODROW.. WILSOfl AHD TH& WORLD WAR, p.5,
"In 1910, with Hew Jersey stirred by a strong popular move
ment against boss-rule, he was tendered the nomination for
Governor of that State. He accepted and proved an ideal
candidate, Though supported by the Democratic machine, which
planned to elect a reformer and then control him, Wilson won
the adherence of independents and progressive Republicans by
his promise to break the power of the boss system, and by the
clarity of his plans for reform".

to the bosses, and after two years of reform administration, he
stood forth as a national figure, and the logical candidate for
the presidency in 1912.

The machine elements, present in the

Democratic Party as in the Republican, endeavored to thwart his
nomination, but by the aid of 3ryan and the Western element, he

10/
The split in the Republican Party made Wilson's election
a foregone conclusion, although he received not quite as many
popular votes as Bryan had received in any one of his three
campaigns*

This reduced figure was no doubt due to the fact

that about 10$ of Roosevelt9a popular vote was drawn from the
Democratic Party. (1).

(lj The Springfield Republican, quoted in the Cincinnati inquirer
of Sept. £8, 1916, says, "It has usually been estimated that fully
10$ of the Roosevelt vote in 1912 was Democratic in origin".

Wilson's conception of the presidency was the result of long
years of study and teaching.

He believed that the president

should be the leader of his party; and, by virtue of the fact
that the party in power is presumed to represent the nation, he
should be the leader of the nation, after the fashion of an Snglis& prime minister.

This conception of his office, coupled with

some peculiarities of temperament, caused him sometimes to be
impatient of opposition.

He was rather & reoluse, not caring to

mix with crowds, although professing to want to know what the people
were saying at their firesides.

He had an ingrained suspicion of

the civic honesty of the Republican Party, due no doubt to his
early Southern training and environment.

(2)2

(2) See sentiments in Wilson18 Indianapolis Speeoh, Jan.9, 1915,
in Messages and Papers of the -tresidents, (J. D. Richardson,Hd.),
Vol. XVIII, pp. 8024-8034; or extracts from the speeoh, In the
IHDSPSHiJSNT, Jan. 13, 1915, p.94.

11/
He waa an idealist by nature, and had mapped out a program of
eoonomlc and social reform which he believed would bring happiness
to the masses; and that the Democratic Party was the divinely
appointed instrument to carry this program into effect.
he was not a
view.

Withal,

friend of Bryan, who oertainly had the same goal in

(1)

(1). Fuller discussions of the Wilson temperament will be found in
Charges Seymour, Woodrow Wilson and the World War, Chap.I.;
A. Maurice Low, Woodrow WiiaonsAn Interpretation; W. E. Dodd,
Woodrow Wilson and His Work; J, P. Tumulty, Woodrow Wilson As I
Knew Him; The Life and Letters of Walter H. Page, B.J.Hendrick, Ed.

Wilson was not a first-class campaigner.
him, and that was all.

People flocked to Bee

He had a few intimate friends, who have

testified to his geniality, his unselfishness, and his personal
$

charm, when in a small circle.

But these are not the character

istics by which he was known to the multitudes.

To the generality

of the American people he remained eold and distant; a statue to be
admired from afar, not a human person to be embraced.

It is worth

while noting how he dropped his early associates one by one: Harvey,
Garrison, Bryan, Martins, MoCombs, Page, Lansing, House, Tumulty.
As a candidate for re-election the people knew him only as an
embodiment of a group of reform causes; honest, idealistic, but
cold and impassive.

They voted for him because of what he repre

sented, as they would have voted fur the retention of a tried
piece of machinery.

Since they did not have to live with him,

his personal characteristics mattered little to them.

(2)

12/
{£) Note to preceding page.
For "Wilson the Candidate", by L. Ames Brown, see Review of
Reviews, July , 1916, pp. 41-45. See also "Wilson", by B. S.
Baker, in Collier's, Oot.7, 1916, pp.5,6,41.
If the analysis of Mr. ‘
Wilson's mental operations were the
chief topic under discussion, much more might be said here.
Wilson's victory in 1916 was based not so muoh on what he was,
as on what people thought he was. For an analysis of Mr. Wilson's
mind, see Collier's, Nov. 11, 1916, p. 10.
AI b o Owen Wister's
Article, "If We Elect Mr. Wilson", Collier's,Nov.4,1916, pp. 5 ff.

Hughes was no more of a good campaigner than Wilson was. (1)

(1)

Norman Hapgood, "Has Hughes Any Case?"
Sept. 4, 1916, p. 243.

in the INMPESBENT,

I
He had the legalistic mind, knowing how to present a case before a
bench of learned judges, but sadly deficient in the knack of rous
ing his audienoe to a pitch of enthusiasm.

As Governor of New York,

1906-10, he had made a record as a reform governor very similar to
Wilson's in New Jersey.

His six years on the Supreme Bench, 1910-16,

did nothing to enhance his excellence as a candidate; and in fact
did him harm, because it put him out of touoh with the Progressive
movement of the West. (2)

(2) For a favorable view, lee "The Recall of Justice Hughes", *>7
B. J. Hendrick, in World's Work, August,1916, pp. 397-410. Also
"Charles B. Hughes as a Political Figure", by Wm. B. Shaw, in
Review of Reviews, July, 1916, pp. 46-50.

Such as they were, they were chosen to represent their parties
and present their claims for the suffrages of the people.

Hughes

spent-most of the campaign on speaking tours over the oountry,
coming to the West no less than three times.

Wilson did not

I

13/
travel much, making most of his oampaign speeches at his countryhome in Hew Jersey; but he did make one trip to uhio, delivering
two notable addresses in Cincinnati.
Introducing the campaign of 1916, the national democratic
Party pointed to its reoord of the past three years, on the
great issue of economic and social reform.

(1)

(1)

Among its

Review of Reviews, August, 1916, pp. 139-141.

enactments were the Federal Reserve Bank Act, emancipating the
industrial and commercial interests of the country from the con
trol of the bankers; the Underwood tariff Law, lowering the duties
on imports; the Income fax Law, shifting the burden of taxation to
those most able to pay; the Federal frade Commission, for the pre
vention of unfair competition; the Seamen's Act, improving the
working conditions of sailors; the Workmen's Compensation Act for
federal employees; laws preventing the use of the injunction in
labor disputes; the Federal Child Labor Law; the Bight-hour Hay,
for federal employees; and the Industrial Employees' Arbitration
Act, for the settlement of great railway and industrial strikes.
All these appealed to the laboring class, and made them feel that
the Democratic Party was their friend.

Some of these laws made

the employers and other business men more determined to vote for
Hughes; but since there are ten times as many employees as there
are employers, the Democrats could well rest content to trade one
u

t

m

m

m

u

w

14/
vote for ten.

(1).

(1)

"How Labor Voted", In Literary Digest, Hov. 25,1916, p. 1391.

Ae an appeal to the farmers, the Democrats could point to the
enaotraent of a Rural Credits Law, a Federal Good Roads law, a
lower tariff, the Smith-Lever Agricultural Extension Act, and
several minor laws also dealing with agriculture.
In the midst of the oampaign came the threat of a great rail
way strike.

Representatives of the four great brotherhoods: the

Locomotive Engineers; Enginemen and Firemen; Conductors; and Train
men, met and demanded an eight-hour day, at the same wages that had
been paid for ten hours, with one and one-half pay for overtime.
The employers replied that it would add $75,000,000 to the pay-roll,
and force an increase in freight rates; and that it would affeot
only 18,d of the total number of employees, and those the most highly
paid already.

Upon failure of the parties to reach an agreement.

President Wilson suggested an eight-hour day with one pay for
overtime.

The employers refused the suggestion and asked for

arbitration; whereupon the Brotherhoods ordered a general strike
for Sept. 4th.

To avert a strike, with its accompanying disasters,

President Wilson forced the Adamson Bill through Congress.
Sept. 1st, the House passed the bill, 239 to 56.

(2)

(2)

On

On Sept. 2nd,2

Of Ohio’s 22 congressmen, seven Republicans and all the nine
Democrats voted for the bill. Pass, Republican, was the only
one who voted against It, and five Republicans did not vote
at all.
Cong. Record, 64th Cong., 1st Session, p. lo379.

15/
the Senate passed it 43 to 28•

On Sunday, Sept* 3rd, the President

signed it, and the strike was called off.

The law provided that

after Jan. 1st, 1917, eight hours should, in eontraots for labor
and service, be deemed a d a y 18 work and the measure or standard
of a day*s work, for the purpose of reckoning the compensation of
employees engaged in the operation of trains.
of protest arose.

Immediately a storm

The President justified his action

partly on

the ground that it averted a national disaster; but fundamentally
because it was an aot of long-delayed Justice.

(1)

(1)

The opposition

The INDJSP2ND3HT, Oct. 2, 1916, p.5.
A suggestion that it
was just a campaign ooup is given in Lit. Digest,Deo.16,1916,p.1583.

pointed out that a group of subordinate organizations had held a
olub over the Federal Government, and that the Government had su*rendered to foroe, an ominous foreboding of things yet to eome. (2)

(2)

World’s Work, Oct. 1916, p. 601; Independent,Sept.18,1916,p.399;
and C. 2. Hughes,"Shall Foroe-or Reason Rule?", in the Independent,
Oct. 9, 1916, pp. 62-64.

The effect in Ohio was marked and decisive.

Wilson and the Demo

cratic Party were hailed as the true friends of labor.

Although

only 13/8 of the 125,000 railway employees in Ohio could reap direct
benefits from the law, yet all railway employees, and labor in
general, praised Wilson for his benevolent attitude.

(3)

The

T37 "30,000 members of the brotherhoods in Ohio were for Wilson".
W. 0. Lee, President of the brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen,
quoted in Literary Digest, Sov. 25, 1916, p. 1391.

16/
Railroad Brotherhoods, from their National Headquarters in
Cleveland, conducted a very effective campaign for President
Wilson*

W. 0* Lee, President of the Brotherhood of Railroad

Trainmen, issued a bulletin addressed to the organization,
as follows:
"Surely it is the duty of not only our own members,
but of all persons who work for a living, to support our
friends; and if possible, to defeat our enemies at the
coming election* Therefore it is earnestly requested
that the position taken by President Wilson and both
branches of Congress be not forgotten, and that all ’
members use every honorable means to retain in office,
regardless of partisan beliefs, those who have proven
their loyalty to the cause of labor".
444— Cincinnati inquirer. Sept. 20, 1916.
Candidate Hughes, in speeches in Dayton, Toledo, and Cleve
land, denounced the law as a blow at both capital and labor,
because of the method and circumstances under which it had been
put through*

(1)

(1)

He olaimed to be a genuine friend of labor,

Hughes's speech at Dayton, Oept. 25f reported in the
Cincinnati inquirer of Sept* 26, 1916.
Speeches at Toledo
and Cleveland reported in inquirer of Sept. 27, 1916.

and pointed to his record.

smile his argument may have been

flawless from a legal standpoint, most listeners reason the
short cut from statement to conclusion, and the labor forces
insisted that no real friend of the eight-hour day would oppose
an eight-hour law.

(2)

(2)

See Appendix III, T

Svery word that Hughes spoke by way2
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of explanation only got him deeper into the mire.

V/hen he

realized his mistake, it was too late to retreat.

To oontinue

hi8 attacks would lose him more and more labor rotes every
day.

To oease or modify his attacks would be an acknowledgement

that Wilson and the Democrats had been right in passing the
law, which would be an argument for continuing the Democratic
Administration in power.

An added embarwaesraent was that 70

Republican congressmen, including ex-3peaker Cannon, had voted
for the bill. (1)

(1)

Governor Willis was politic enough to

Cong. Record, 64th Cong., 1st Session, p. 13879.

declare himself in favor of the Adamson Law.

(2)

(2).

Cincinnati .Enquirer, Oct. 3, 1916.

The practical men at the head of the Republican organization
in Ohio felt on September 1st that the State was safely Republican,
both State and Rational; but after September' 3rd they could feel
the labor vote slipping away from them day by day. (3)

(3)

Secretly

From an interview with a Republican leader of the 1916
campaign, who asked that hi3 name be withheld. See also
Appendix III,H.

they gave up hope of carrying the State for the Rational ticket,
and devoted their energios to holding down the Wilson vote as much
as possible, in the hope of saving something from the wreck, and
electing Governor Willis by a small majority.
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It is significant of the exactness with which both Democratic
and Republican State organizations had polled the State, that three
days before the election, as was afterwards made known, both
committees had oaloulated that if Wilson's plurality could be held
down below 75,000, the Republicans could carry the governorship;
while anything over 75,000 for Wilson would also mean the election
of Cox.

(1)

And so it turned out.

(1)

Cincinnati finq.uirer, „0ct. 29, 1916, "The ballot fixed up by
the Secretary of State"will force straight voting. Cox will
profit from the great Wilson strength, while Willis has nothing
to gain from Hughes. If Wilson has 75,000 majority, it means
defeat for Willis, Kerriok, and all the rest of the Republican
ticket".
Also confirmed by private conversation with polit
ical manager.
# C. Q,. Hilde’
orant.

The Great War. had now been going on for two years.

The pop

ulations of Europe had turned from production to destruction, and
had to look elsewhere for manufactured artioles and food products.
The United States, as the one great supply country that was still
pursuing the arts of peace, found a ready market for all its sur
plus.

The result was a feverish war prosperity in America that

suspended the ordinary laws of economics.

Everybody that was

willing to work had a good Job at good wages.

The farmers were

becoming rich because of high prices for food-stuffs,

War, which

was dealing death and destruction to Europe, was bringing increased
life and prosperity to America.

If the United States should enter

the war, not only would death and destruction operate here, but ws
would consume our own surpluses, and our prosperity would largely
stop.

Hence, when the campaign cry, "He kept us out of war", was
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published, it found a welcome response from those who had material
interests to serve, as well as from those who did not want their
eons to be soldiers; or, as a political placard bluntly expressed
it, "to be cannon fodder".

The slogan, "He kept us out of war",

was more extensively used than any other, because it was concrete,
easily understood, and appealed to man's dearest instinct, that of
self-preservation. (1)

(1J

In 52 reports from 44 counties, repre-

The democratic Campaign Text Book, 1916, devoted considerable
space to this phase; pp. 100-123.

seating every section of the State, the great majority of those
who had charge of county political affairs reported that the war
issue outweighed all other considerations# (2)

It never

(2) Result of a questionnaire issued by the writer.
occurred to them to question why the same horror of war did not
operate to enable Wilson to carry every state in the Union.
It is also noteworthy that Wilson himself never used this
argument in his own favor.

The war was a nuisance to him.

Ke

felt that his great mission in life was to complete the program
of economic and social reform that he had entered upon; and here
was the war, like a red herring across his trail.

Hot a single

one of Wilson's speeches during 1916 may be called a peace speech.(3)3

(3) "Wilson1s own speeches, however, contained nothing to Justify
an expectation that peace would necessarily continue • A.al.
Schlesinger, i’ol. d Social history of U. S., p. 514.
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The climax was reached on October £6, in his Cincinnati speeches,
when he said,
"This is the last war of the kind or of any kind that involves
the world that the United States can keep out of. I say this
because 1 believe that the business of neutrality is over;
not because I want it to be over; but I mean this: That war
now has such a scale that the position of neutrals sooner or
later becomes ij\tolerablen .
"Some day we may have to use the physical force of this
nation.
What are we going to use it for? Being the nation
that we are, we mu3t try to use it to prevent aggression
by any other nation".
(1)

(1)

Both quotations from Cincinnati inquirer, Oot. 27, 1916.

In the excitement of the moment the significance of these words
was overlooked; and, strangely enough, they were interpreted as
peace speeches.

But by one who takes up Wilson's speeches of 1916

that mention the war, and links them up with his offer of mediation
a month later, and with his war speeches of several months later,
a series leading toward war can be noted from the very beginning.
If a person repeats a statement often enough, he finally comes
to believe it himself.

It appears then, that a slogan that was

intended at first to appeal only to the superficial mind, and did
not go to the real heart of things, was repeated so often that
people actually came to believe that that was why they voted aA
they did.

The average voter, who had already made up his mind

to vote for Wilson for other and more fundamental reasons, was
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glad enough to add thiB one as a clincher to the rest.

(1)

(1)

In view of the later entranoe of America Into the Oreat
War, President Wilson's apologists have argued that since
Wilson himself never claimed that "he kept us out of war",
he cannot be accused of obtaining offioe under false pretense.
3ut the acts of the agent are the aots of the principal, and
Wilson certainly knew that the slogan was being used, fie
said as much in his Cincinnati speeches, fie also knew as
early as September 1916, that war was inevitable, as the
following news reports show:
"Germany expeots to declare a blockade on England January
1st, 1917. Ho compunction will be felt regarding the revival
of submarine warfare, because it is felt that England's
abrogation of the Declaration of London has left Germany
free of restraint in the matter of her promises to America".
— Cincinnati Enquirer, Sept. 12, 1916.
The Cincinnati Enquirer of Oct. 10, 1916, also states
that Ambassador Gerard has informed. Wilson that Germany
intends to withdraw the Sussex Pledge.

The mothers of the country were largely concerned about this
election, on account of the war issue.

There were only twelve

woman suffrage states in 1916, and Ohio was not one of them.
Illinois was the only one east of the Mississippi, and Hughes
carried it.

(2)

West of the Mississippi, Wilson carried ten

(2) See oomaent on this point, in World's Work, Deo. 1916,p.118.
woman suffrage states out of eleven, losing only Oregon.

Since

Wilson oarried 18 out of the 22 states west of the Mississippi,
woman suffrage cannot have been the determining factor.

(3)

(3)3

Comment in World1a Work, DeOe 1916t p. 111* Outlook,
Nov. 15, 1916, pp. 574, 578.
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The indirect influence of the women of Ohio in persuading theirar^^
husbands to vote for Wilson may have been considerable, but this
factor could also operate in the states east of Ohio, as may be
assumed from the reduced pluralities for Hughes everywhere*
Whether the reduced pluralities were due to women persuading the
men to vote for Wilson, or to the laboring m a n 1? friendly attitude
toward Wilson, would be a topis for endless and useless debate*
More vital, as a national problem, was the question of the
"Hyphen”, or how the German-Americans would vote.

The Great

War found the German-Americans in a delicate position*

Liberal

at heart, many would have been glad to see the select aristocratic
»
government of Germany superseded by one more directly democratic. .
Nevertheless, they had no desire to.see their native land over
whelmed by the French, English, and Russians; and it ground their
soul* to hear Americans with no first-hand knowledge of European
affairs denounoe the German race*

And yet, in the presence of

the prevailing American sympathy for the Allies, to retort to
such accusations was to incur the suspicion of being anti-American
and traitorous.

The fact that the Allies, owing to their command

of the sea, had access to our ports for supplies, whil.e Germany
did not, would naturally exasperate them against the administra
tion, no matter of what party it happened to be*

A Republican

president, under the same circumstances, would ha vs had to observe
international law Just as Wilson did, and would have incurred the
Bame odium from the German-Americans*

It happened that Wilson

was in the chair, and the first impulse-of the Berman-Americans
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waa to rally to the opposing nominee*

However, as the campaign

progressed, several things happened to maJce them change their
minds*

Roosevelt’s vigorous support of Hughes created the ±m?

impression that he would bo the dominant figure in the admin*
istration if Hughes should be elected; and as Roosevelt’s
attitude toward Germany was well known, the German*-Americans
began to drift back to Wilson as the lesser of two evils.

(1)

(1)

Appendix IX.
Also Lit. Digest, Get. 28, 1916, p. 1089,
’’German-Americans will not vote for Hughes because they
think that he is only a figurehead for Roosevelt, and that
fiojsevelt would have a lot to say in the administration
if Hughes were elected".
*
T'hie was especially true of Ohio, as the election returns

from the German centers showed.

(2)

(2)

The Democratic campaign

See Appendix VIII, C, B, L.
The Census Reports do not
give the nationality of the American*born, but only of the
foreign*born. According to the Census of 1920, Ohio had
678,697 foreign-born, of whom 111,893, or 16,6 ,
were
Germans. Of 13 counties having more than 1000 foreign-born,
14 went for Wilson, Hamilton County alone going for
Hughes, but by a reduced majority.

managers, fishing in all waters, encouraged them in this, having
in mind also the election of Cox, since many of the Germans were
anti-prohibitionists.

By election day the German element

was

pretty well split up, the majority of the native-born Germans
voting for Hughes,and the American-born voting mostly for Wilson. (3)

Also World’s Work, Deo. 1916, p
(3) See Aapendlx VIII, X.
Outlook,*’Rov. 22, 1916, p. 622; Lit. Digest, Oct. 21, 1916
Lit. Digest, flov. 25, 1916, p. 1394, "How the Hyphen Voted

117;
p.1020;
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For those few Germans who placed loyalty to Germany above loyalty
to America, both Hughes and Wilson expressed contempt in their
campaign speeches.
While Roosevelt1a activity in the campaign was primarily to
beat Wilson, our interest in him is mainly in what he was able
to do towards bringing the Progressives back into the Republican
camp and healing the wounds of the campaign of 1912.

Long

before the split of 1912 there were two factions in the Republican Party of Ohio, both conservative. (1)

As the old leaders

(1)

One faction may be recognized by the names Sherman,
McKinley, Hanna, and Lick; the other by the names of
b Foraker, Bushnell, and Kurtz.

died off one by one and new ones took their places, there were
alignments and realignments of groups, until it was difficult,
if not impossible, to trace the line of descent.
and policies gave no clue.

Their principles

As far as the leaders were concerned,

it was mostly a battle of thenins"and the"outa"

to get or keep

oontrol of the State organization.
However, the opening of the year 1912 revealed a large
Progressive element in the Republican Party of Ohio.
at the primaries they elected

In faot,

31 Roosevelt delegates to the

Republican Rational Convention, as against 17 for Taft.

In

response to Rooseveltfs call, the Ohio Progressives formed a
state organization, and were Joined by some anti-Taft Republican
leaders whose interest in Roosevelt was only perfunctory.

They

knew that Wilson would carry the state, but they were playing
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tor place in the race; so that when the eventual reconciliation
would occur, they could claim the right to control the State
organization by virtue of the fact that they represented a
majority of tfcie Republicans of Ohio#

Unfortunately for them,

they came in third, the vote standing
Wilson,
Democratic
Taft*
Republican
Roosevelt, Progressive

424,834
£78,168
££9,807

Unwilling to rejoin the Republican Party as repentant sinners
they waited for a more favorable occasion#
brought them no oomfort#

The election of 1914

Willis, a man who had not been in the

former factional fights, was elected Governor on the regular
Republican ticket, scouring 5£3,000 votes, while the Progressive
vote shrank to 60,000#
Willis proved to be a greater peacemaker than Hughes was to
prove two years later; and when Willis was renominated in 1916,
it was expected that he oould count on the full strength of the
Progressives#

As stated before, he would have won if the State

ballot had been separate from the Rational; but, as it wap,
Hughes dragged him down to defeat#
Straw votes showed that about one-fourth of the Progressives
of 191£ intended to vote for Wilson. (1)

(1)

If these. 55,000 had

See Appendix IV, 3, C#

voted for Hughes instead of Wilson, Hughes would have carried
the State by £0,000#

No doubt most of the Progressives have

beon included in the afore-mentioned groups of farmers and
laboring men, and voted for Wilson because something in the

record of the Wilson Administration appealed to them#

(1)

(1)

Review of Reviews, Deo. 1916, p. 588, "A good many of the
Ohio Progressives seem to have voted for Wilson.". See also
Summary of W. R, Hearit's "The Real Answer", in Collier's,
Deo. 9, 1916, p. 9.
Also F. M. Davenport, "Still on the
Trail of National Opinion", in Outlook, June 7, 1916, pp.322-5.

Frontier states are always democratic; and when Ohio balloted in
1916 she was lining up with the frontier states of the Par West.
It was the Jackson-Adams Campaign of 1828 over again; the West
and South combining against the Hast.

The West suspected that

Hughes was under the thumb of the Eastern conservatives, and
would have none of him. (2)

pp.JJyV-9
(2) Independent, Nov. 20, 1916; Lit. Digest, Nov. 25, 1916,
pp. 1392-3, "How the Progressives Voted".
"While Hughes lost California and thereby lost the
presidency, Hiram Johnson, the Republican candidate
for U. S. Senator in California carried the State by
nearly 300,000 majority. This clearly indicates that
thousands of California Progressives voted for Wilson.
This was largely due to Hughes's unfortunate campaign
visit to that State, when he allowed himself to be
guided entirely by the reactionary wing of his party.
He was not allowed to meet Governor Johnson n o V to have
anything to do with the Progressives of the State. If
he had any Progressive leanings or convictions, he
seemed not to allowed or was unwilling to express them.
This the California voters resented in fear that Hughes
was lined up with the reactionary forces of invisible
government. So far as EugheB seemed to know, California
Progressives had no existence. The California incident
had great weight in other sections of $he country. It
appeared that six years of servioe on the benoh had made
him oblivious of a deoade of political progress in the
West. This is sufficient to explain why Hughes lost
California, Washington, Kansas, OHIO, and tne election.3 (3)

(3)

J. A. Woodburn, Political Parties & Party Problems in CJ.S.,p.206
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In his speech of acceptance, Sept, 2 f 1916, President Wllsdn
appealed to the Progressives in the following words: "We have in
four years

come very near to carrying out the platform of the

Progressive Party as well as our own; for we also are progressives"•(1]

(1) Messages and Papers of the Presidents, XVIII, p. 8153. See
also Appendix IV, F; and Lit. Digest, «ov. 18, 1916, pp.
1312-5, "Why Wilson Won”.
L. B. Shippee, Recent American
History, p. 421, in enumerating the reasons for the reelection of President Wilson, gives first, "the influence
of the Progressives who were distrustful of Hughes and his
advisers"; seoond, "the prosperity of the fanners of the
Mississippi valley"; and only third, the "kept us out of
war" appeal.
To make sure that nothing was omitted, Vance McCormick,
National Democratic Chairman, issued a statement calling attention
to the unprecedented prosperity of the country both in the city
and on the farm. (2)

Everything that the farmer wanted to sell

(2) See Appendix V{ A.
brought a fancy price.

President Wilson had brought peace and

prosperity to the country.

Why change for an uncertainty?

It

would be foolish to deny that many voted for Wilson because he
kept us out of war.

But prosperity was Just as important as

peace, if an election was to be won.

^he peace slogan would

have availed nothing if times had been bad.

Wilson himself

said, "You cannot worship Cod on an empty stomach.
be a patriot when you are starving". (3)3

(3)

Cincinnati Enquirer, Oct* 22, 1916.

You cannot
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Tho organization of the campaign in Ohio showed the Republicans
at a disadvantage.

Their managers were able,

(1)

but they had

{1) Chairman S tate Centsal Committee, Edwin Jones; Chairman State
Executive Committee, Charles Hatfield.
not drilled enough in preparation for the great game of 1916.(2)
)))_________ ■
................................ ....................
(2) Letters to the writer from leaders in both parties agree
that the Democrats had the better organization.
The Progressive leaders were unwilling to oome back to the Re
publican Party unless they were assured of a prominent, if not
a predominating influence; and accordingly, James R. Garfield
was made a member of the Hughes Campaign Committee. (3)

(3)

But

World's Work,Sept. 1916, p. 638.
after all, the situation was not effectually remedied. (4)

(4)

Outlook, June 7, 1916, p. 323; Nov. 22, 1916, pp. 646 ff.

Even at that, Walter F. Brown, who had been the Progressive
State Chairman,' co-operated with the Republican Party.
Democrats had able leaders, unified their

The

organization, and

on election day got every Democrat out to the polls. (5)
'

♦5

(5) Letter to the writer from vSm*
Chairman in 1916.

Durbin, Democratic State
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^he uaual program of speech-making tours was gone through
with by both parties*

Hughes made three visits to Ohio;

though, as the result proved, it would have been better for
the Republican ticket, both State and National, had he stayed
away.

His remarks were mostly oritical, not constructive; (1)

(1) World's Work, Oct. 1916, p.605. Norman Hapgood, "Mr. ’Wilson's
Leadership", in Independent, Oct.E, 1916,p . 15.
C. R. Lingley.
"Since the Civil War, p. 570.
and he was unable to convince the independent voter that he was
not under obligations to Wall Street.
Adamson Act was disastrous.

His opposition to the

His criticism of Wilson's war

policy brought upon him the withering question, "What would
you have done?"

Wilson's speeches in Cincinnati showed that

he was picking his words carefully, and not allowing himself
to be led up a blind alley.

Roosevelt made a series of speeches

urging the election of Hughes, at the risk of alienating the
votes of German-Americans.
In the main, however, the state organizations depended upon
the newspapers for their appeal; and here the Democrats had the
advantage. (2)

. O f the metropolitan press, the Democrats had 2

(2) The Lit. Digest, Sov. 18, 1916, p. 1315, quotes from the
Cleveland Plain Lealer, "Not the least of the reasons for the
Wilson vote was the fact that the President had by far the
best of newspaper support in the State” ; and from the Cincinnati
Times-3tar, "A large majority of city newspapers in Ohio were
with the Democrats in this campaign. That was one of the
principal reasons for Democratic success"•
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tha support of the Cleveland Plain Dealer, the Cincinnati iSn^uirer,
the Columbus Dispatch, all the Cox papers, and all the ScrippaMcRae papers*

The Republican ticket was aupported by the Toledo

Times, the Dayton Journal and Herald, the Cleveland News-Leader,

the Akron Beacon-Journal,
tha Cinoinnatl Times-3tar, and, rather weakly, by the Ohio State
Journal,

The Democrats were thus able to reach a muoh larger

constituency every day.

To have the virtues of Wilson and the

weaknesses of Hughes before the eyes daily for three months,
on the street, in the street-oar, and in the home,

had a

psychological effeot upon the undecided voter that no amount
of argument could overcome.

Toward the close of the campaign,

both parties, having hitherto reserved their ammunition and
their cash, came out in flaming advertisements, portraying in
lurid piotures and in almost violent language, the terrible
calamities to be expected if the opposing candidate were elected.
In this mode of warfare the Democratic Publicity Department
showed great superiority.

Cartoons took the place of cold

logic for those who preferred that kind of appeal.

The dally

publication of results of straw votes, showing a big drift
from former Republicans and Progressives to Wilson, had their
effect upon the voter who wants to elimb upon the band-wagon.
Reports of betting in the big oities, with the odds on Wilson,
appealed to still another elass, and with this gesture the
campaign came to an end*
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The State election figures were: Wilson, 604,161; Hughes, 514,753.
Hughes carried only 31 counties of the 88, all rural except one,
and all by reduced pluralities.

(See Map in Appendix).

them contained large cities exoept Hamilton,

Hone of

(Cincinnati), and

this he carried by 12,000, a reduction of 4000 from the normal
plurality.

The oountles that he carried were scattered in all

corners of the State.

He lost 25 counties that Taft had carried

in 1908, and he gained none that Taft had lost.

Evidently the

farmers were satisfied with Wilson.
The counties with large oities were particularly destructive
to his hopes, showing reversals as follows:
Taft Plurality,
1908.
Cuyahoga
Lucas
franklin
Mahoning

(
(
(
(

Cleveland)
Toledo
)
Columbus )
Youngstown )

16,000
2,500
5,600
1,400

Wilson Plurality,
1916
20,000
14,000
10,000
1,700

While Montgomery County, (Payton), which had given :
plurality of 500 in 1908, gave Wilson one of 4600 in 1916.
These enormous reversals in the industrial oenters show
clearly that Wilson made his strongest appeal to the laboring
classes, on account of his reoord in favoring labor legislation,
and especially by his advocacy of the Adamson law.

(1)

(1)

"The President showed marked strength in every industrial
oenter except East Liverpool". Ohio Otate Journal, Sov.12,1916.

"The great industrial oenters of the Middle West began to
give evidence that the labor vote was being given to the
President, and later reports from agrarian states proved the
correctness of the assumption that the farmer vote would be
cast for W i l s o n ' T h e fact that the nation is unwontedly
prosperous and enjoying constructive, if not actual peace,
with all nations, seems to have outweighed all other consider
ations with a majority of the voters.
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( Note of preceding page continued)
"Apparently the average voter ia content with the present,
and ia giving himself no oonoern for the future. Neither
v/ara, rumors of wars, panics, nor financial cataclysms
disturbed his serenity and confidence".
Cincinnati Enquirer,
Nov. 10, 1916.

SULiitARY.
The result of the Presidential Campaign of 1916 in Ohio
oan best be described as a case of "political atavism".
Ohio waa once a frontier state; and, before the slavery
question became acute, the Democrats usually controlled,
the State, because the principles of that party were more
in harmony with frontier ideas of equality.

But since

the organization of the Republican Party in 1854, the
State had uniformly given its electoral vote to the
Republican Presidential candidates.

Even this was no

reversal of attitude, because the Republican Party
claimed to be the true descendant of Jefferson, and
equality was thejrr

key-word; while the Democrats, in

espousing the cause of slavery, had become the party of
inequality.

After the Civil War, the Democratic ship

righted itself again; but in the meantime, Ohio, by
becoming an industrial state, had ceased to

he a frontier

state, and had "become distinctly a part of the Eastern
social organism, much like the State of Pennsylvania11. (1)
(1)

F. J.( Turner, The Frontier in American History, p. 231.

Occasional flashes of Democracy burst forth at times in the

election of a democratic Governor or United States Senator,
but in the main it was a conservative Republican State.
But as in biology, so in politics, recessive characteristics
sometimes reassert themselves, and 1916 was one of the times.
If ever atavism showed itself in politics, this was the time.

That it really was "recessive" is proved by the enormous
Republican majorities that Ohio has given in the three presi
dential elections since 1916, (1920, 401,000; 1924, 693,000;
1928, 763,000).
The editorial prophecies of November and December, 1916,
that if the Republicans ever wanted to carry Qftio again, they
must get rid of their reactionary attitude, have failed of
fulfilment.

The Republican platforms and candidates of 1920

and 1924 were Just as reactionary as those of 1916, and yet
they swept Ohio by unprecedented majorities.

The reason for

the Ohio decision of 1916, therefore, remains as before,
"political atavism".
That it could not have been because of the slogan,
"He kept us out of war", is evident when all the other facts
are taken into consideration.

If that were true, Wilson

must have carried every State in the Union.

It cannot be

assumed that the parents who voted for Hughes held the lives
of their sons any less precious than those who voted for Wilson.(1)
Chas. E. Morris, Gov. Cox's Secretary, takes the view that
the slogan was incidental, while the attitude of labor, influenced
by the Adamson Bill, was more persuasive, letter to writer.
The Independent, Oct. 30, 1916, p. 179, says that "There are
three high spots in the campaign. The first is the democratic
record of l e g is la t io n — a record of unusual fulness and excellence.
It is on this record primarily that the administration asks to
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Speaking o& the result3 where woman98 suffrage was a factor,
William Allen White says:
”3ut of all the foolish reasons given for blaming Mr*
Wilson’s election on the women, the least plausible is
to declare that they voted for him becausec nhe kept us
out of war". That slogan was a Joke, The women who
voted for the President’s re-election did so in spite
of his foreign policy,... .The Democratic program was
the Progressive Platform of 1912". (1)
(1)

Article, "Who billed Cock Robin?", Collier’s, Dec. 16.
1916, p. 26.

Hughes, constituted as he was, could not stretch out far
enough to grasp the hands of the Western Progressives without
letting go his grip of the Eastern conservatives.

A more

adept political acrobat might have had a tacit understanding
with his Pastern friends that he be allowed to make Progressive
speeches in the West without endangering his prospects in the
East.

But Hughes is the sort of man who must say what he

thinks, even at the wrong time and place.
were his attacks on the Adamson Law.

Of suoh a sort

If Eac-Speaker Cannon,

simon-pure standpatter, oould vote for the Adamson Law,
Hughes could well have dismissed it with a wave of the hand. (2)
(2)

Lit. Digest, Nov. 25, 1916, p. 1391.

He might have said, If It is & good thing, we all want it;
if it turns out to be a bad thing, Wilson must bear the
blame for it.”
But he walked into the trap, and that was the end of the
game, as far as Ohio was concerned.

The laboring class
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decided to vote for the man that was smiling upon them, whether
anything tangible came of it or not.
The European War, gigantic as it was, was an unwelcome inci
dent in the life of Wilson,

He was looking to the West

for

support for his program of economic and social reform, and
Ohio was part of the West for the time being.

The "Hyphen"

question was ephemeral; and woman's suffrage, as a significant
factor in the election of presidents, was still in the future.
The percentage of women who could and would vote in 1916 was
not large enough to use a3 a basis tot a national campaign.
And so Wilson was content to let people say that he had kept
them out of war.

He neither affirmed nor denied it.

When a

man is running for office, everything is grist that comes to
his mill. (1)

Wilson wanted a second term in order to

(1) See paragraph "All Things to All Men", Review of Reviews,
Hov. 1916, p. 474.
finish the program that he had begun in his first term, for
he was confident that Htghes would not carry it to completion.
A final word of speculation as to what would have been the
result if Ohio had gone Republican and thereby had seated Hughes
in the Presidential chair.

Of one thing we are sure, America

was fated to enter the War anyhow, no matter which party was in
power.

With Hughes in the chair, a large part of the American

people would have believed to the end of their days that if
Wilson had been retained, America would not have been drawn into
the Jar. ’If it was a reaction from a disappointed expectation

that impelled, the Amerioan electorate to vote a Republican
administration into power in 1920, it may not ha fanciful
to oonclude that Ohio, by insuring a Democratic victory in
1916, paved the way for Republican suooess in 1920 and for
the two succeeding presidential campaigns.

ai’.;jggjix

i.

"Hl'2 AERT US OUT OF r.'AR".
..
ln ®P©soli at iewistown, ae., Aug. 31, 1916:
At this moment, Dr. iVilaon's buglemen advance as his
greatest claim that ’He has kept us out of war*.
Ihls claim
can be seriously made only by individuals who indorse
President Viilaon’s belief that deeds are nothing and words
everything” . ( Ihoro speech on Wilson’s Mexican wobbling,
Vera Cru*, lampico, etc.) 444— CIHCIN-ATI EN-iUIRER, Sept. 1,
1916 •
Attorney-General T.W.Gregory, at Bangor, He.,Aug. 31, 1916:
As a part of his (Wilson’s) administration, I here and now
announce that so long as President > Wilson presides over the
destinies of this nation, so long will words.; and not deeds
be resorted to in keepidg peace with the nations, until
words have ceased to be effective and peaoe can no longer
be honorably maintained", —
CIHCJL’J .ATI ENQUIRES, Sept. I,
1916.
Harry is. Daugherty, Sept. 2.:
"War has made business good in this country, and without
the war business would be bad. If the voters will appre
ciate the fact that this unusual condition causes good
business temporarily; and that after the war closes, unless
we are again on a sound Republican protective tariff basis,
we will suffer financial disaster, they will elect Hughes
and Palrbaxucs and a Republican Congress. If they are
listless, or swept off their feot by the keynote, ’Stand by
the President’, then the Republican Party and the oountry
will lose.... "Ohio is safely Republican on industrial issues,
and we have a good ticket nominated". — CII1CI3”ATI B3Q0IR2R,
Sept. 3, 1916.
v¥. A. Julian, of Cincinnati:
)))
"Everywhere X found a strong Wilson sentiment; and "Peaoe
and Prosperity" was the Democratic battle-cry.....Wilson and
Marshall will easily carry Uhio". — ClitCIHBATI ES iDlHER,
Sept. 3, 1916.
On Sept. Qth; in Congi-ess, Representative Allen of Cincinnati
(Democrat), retorted to the anti-Teutonio utterances of Rep
resentative Augustus D. Gardner of Massachusetts, speaking
of the Democratic Party, £sr. Allen said:
"We believe in neutrality. >Ve are opposed to the polioy
advocated by the gentleman which would have forced ua into
war with Germany on the question of Belgium"•
....
Phis promises to be the administration s appeal to the
German vote during the next two months. Party orators will
hold to the fact that Republicans uwged a policy which might
have led this country into a war with Germany, and that
President Wilson declined to be driven.— — CiuCi.1. Al*

£*i’i ^UXS
'*Hilt^ w*dpte 9 t 1^16*
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K13?T U3 OUT OF iVAR".

ihe peace issue is no doubt swinging many of the farmers
ox the ‘»eat and Middle .Vest toward the President; but such
straw votes as havs been taken thus far among the farmers
indicate that those who have been Republicans heretofore
are liicely to be Republicans this year, Ahile the railway
op n a t i v e s and a great many of the other wage-earners of the
country appear to be devoted to the President because of the
eight-hour law; the farmers, having no respect for eight-hour
days, are seemingly inclined to take the other view of the
matter”.
-----CXBCIH3ATI SH4&IP2R, Oct. 1, 1916.

15*

senator Fomerene, address at Cleveland, uct. 2rd;
nThe election of hughes means war because he wishes to sub
stitute deeds for words. She re-election of Wilson means the
continuance of the peace, plenty, and prosperity which we are
now enjoying, and at the same time peace with honor; peace
without the surrender of an American right; peace with the
maintenance of our self-reapeAt".— — CINCINNATI iSNQUIRSR,
Oot. 4, 1916.

F.

Timothy S. Hogan , at Springfield, OJjiom, Oct. 7 ;
f,I£ Hughes be elected President of the United States, we
have a right to asoutae that Roosevelt will be either Secretary
of State or secretary of <ar. #ith either portfolio under •
his control, the American people need hope for no peace at
home or a,oroa±n. — — -CIHCIIWAM SH^UIRSH, Oct. 8, 1916.

0.

"Taking their cue from the recent speeches of Hughes, the
Ohio Republican management now plane to begin a systematic
campaign to convince the voters that Hughes's election means
peace an earnestly as would President Wilson's re-election.
The Republicans have obtained expressions which convince them
that the strongest reason back of the apparent drift is the
peace sentiment”. — — CISCW&ATI i3N vUIR2R, Oct. 17, 1916.

H.

Republican Campaign Advertisements
s
"The democratic fiction-writers, and the talented talkingmachines wound uo at Washington, are monotonously repeating,
'lie kept ua out. of war1, what was did ftilsoa keep U3 out o f?
In an address to Congress, the President himself referred t o
the European
r as nA war with which we have nothing to do ,
a war whose causes do not touch u s 1”.
CIHCINJATI
u ct.
1916.
Wilson's Speech In Cincinnati, Jet. £6, to women, in the
the last war of the hind or of any icind that involve a
ie world that the United States can Iceap out if. I any thia
jeause i believe that tne buaineaa of neutrality *3
»oause 1 want it to be over; but I moan tnia: -hat war ha a now
I S a s c a l e i n a i the yoaition of neutral., aooner or later

scomea in t o le r a b le ” *

--------CW ClS.^fx tJ v ilx u * . o c t .* 7 ,1 9 1 6 .

A1VJ3NDIX 1.

(Continued.)

"Hit KEPT as OUT JF .VARn.
Wilson's Speech at ilusio ii&ll, Cincinnati, Oct. 26;
"Some day we may have to use the physical force of this nation.
♦<hat are we going to use it for? doing the nation ’that we are.
wo must try tv> use it to prevent aggression by any other nation”*
---.-CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Cot. 27f 1916.

Political Advertisements:
In Cincinnati Enquirer;
oct. 31, 1916f Republican Publicity Committee Advertisement, p.7,
"HAS HE KEPT US OUT OF tfAR?"
Hov. l f 1916, Ditto, Adv., p.7— "BACK TO TiLS BREAD LINE IF
WILSON1S TARIFF IS ROT REPEALED"
Nov. 1, 1916, p .9.-— Editorial from Chicago Daily News of Oct. 25,
1916, criticising Wilson. Published us a Republican Rational
Publicity Committee advertisement.
Nov. 6, 1916, p.7. — — — Democratic Advertisement.:
"YOU ARE WORKING, NOT FIGHTING!
ALIVE AND HAPPY* NOT CANNON-FODDER!
ST.LSOS AND PEACE KITH HONOR ?
OH
HUGHES WITH ROOSEVELT AND WAR.
"Roosevelt says we should hang our heado in shame because
we are not at war with Germany in behalf of Belgium!
"Roosevelt says tnat following the sinking of the Lusitania
he would have foregone diplomacy and seized every ship^in
our ports flying the German flag! THAT tfJULD HAVE /ASAIi? WAHJ
Hughes says that he and Roosevelt are in complete accord.
The Lesson is Plain.
If you want war, vote for Hughes!
*
If you want jyeaoe with Honor, vote for Wilson!
and continued Prosperity.
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A.

"Laznuel (Jumpers, irresi&ent of the American Federation of
Laborf denounced the decisions of the supreme Court in the
.Danbury hatters and Arizona Anti-Alien Law oases, which were
participated in by Charjes 12. Hughes, the Republican nominee".
-CINCINNATI ElfQOIRJSR, Sept. i3, 1916,

B.

J. vV, Faulkner, speaking of Hughes1a efforts to hold the
labor vote in Jhlo while berating the Adamson law, said:
"That labor would decide this ejection has been Justified
by this week’s happenings. From now on udtil election day,
it will be the task of the Republicans Vo prevent as far as
possible the desertion of their cause by the workingmen, who
have hitherto been steadfast; and to gain as many votes as
possible from members of all the other parties who are
alarmed because of labor’s great legislative coup".—
— C i n c i n n a t i a:r;oi%2r 9 sept. 2 4 , 1916.

C.

Straw vote in Nebraska:— "Among the laboring classes,
especially mechanics, the drift is toward Wilson; strongly
so with railroad trainmen and organized labor".
13 KANSAS:— aLverything indicates that the Republicans will
carry Kansas by 8J,0jj to 9090j 0 majority".
OfiIJ VALLSY •— "Drift of the labor vote to President ViIcon
is regarded as largely responsible for the lead of the Pres
ident over hie running /nates on the state tickets".
Almost invariably where the polls have been taken in
factories and workshops, the ballots of the wage-earners
have shown a marked preference for the President".
"Whether this is because the workingmen have adopted the
former slogan of the Republicans, "Let well enough alone";
or whether it is because they approve the President’s stand
on the Adamson Law; or both, are questions causing consider
able speculation among party leaders?.
"However, polls taken among laboring groups have kept the
President well in the running, despite his adverse vote in
office buildings and financial and b u sin e ss districts •
"In this connection, polls taken of the Queen and Crescent
railroad shops and of the Pullman Car shops in ..Aidlow, Ky.,
are regarded as significant. In each of these places, a
decided approval of the President was manifested byo the
employees, not one of whoa was directly affected oy the
Adamson Law. The result is taken as indicative of their
approval of the President’s attitude on tli&t particular
piece of legislation".---CINCINNATI
uept. £4, 19x6.

Aiur-JSNDH II
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LA30R.
'

1:{ OhlO: 'Various conditions indioate that President Silaon'a
candidacy will develop strength beyond that of hla party. The
iresident la meeting with the approval of the laboring olaaa.
iteBulta of polls token in factories and industrial institutions
in Cincinnati and Hamilton have provon that fact, Just as the
secret ballots from the offices of the capitalists, bankers, and
buainesa men in the suae cities have shown Hughes in higher
favor"
CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, dejit. 2d, 1916.
Cincinnati inquirer of Nov 10, 1916, quoting NSW ORLEANS
PICAYUNE:
"It was ’
.Vilson’s policy toward labor and his
firmness in keeping the country out of war, that won for him".
Straw Vote— "Fewer manufacturing plants and laboring groups
were vi3ited during the week than previously, but those includ
ed in the survey tended to support previous assertions that
labor was friendly to the President's candidacy".
"Everywhere, this week as last, there are indications that
the wage-earner voter is leaning strongly toward the President,
while the b u B l n e 3 8 drift is toward the Republicans",
"Peace ocoupiea a prominent plaoe in the consideration of the
•diddle Vestern and rural voter, but it may be str.ted that the
Adamson Jill and the tariff are the outstanding features of the
campaign". -----CINCINNATI ENQUIRER,
Oct. 1, 1916.
3IRA.7 VOTE:-— Ohio: "3uli of the labor vote will go to Wilson."
CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Oct. £9, 1916.

y
Jamuel Qompers, President of the American Federation of labor:' "The American federation of Labor h a s ..... proclaimed the polit
ical policy to stand by the friends of labor and Justice and to
defeat its enemies. In this campaign, A'oodrow Vilson Btanda
for all t'nat is true to labor, Justice, patriotism, freedom,
and humanity". — CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Nov. 7, 1916, p. 9.
"There is no concealment of the tremendous Bentiment for
Nilsoa In the vast majority of the industrial centers of the
country".— CLEVELAND PLAIN D.UALSR, Nov, 5, 1916, p. 7.
James W. Faulkner:
"If the Democrats are to rataln their supremacy at «ashIn^ton. they must ascurs the votes of the farmers and the
wording classes".
SUG A R Y : -- In 1396, the working olass was
successfully appealed tq to vote for .loAlnley, to Insure the
return of prosperity. Then, labor was dependent on and stood
in &ive of capital. Jy 1916, labor had Decode
indent of
capital and resentful of au-;eBtion as to how it snouid vote.
Threat of closing a shop in case an election wsnt a certain
way would cause a stride • The threat of a str-ice in case
e
Adamson i3ill was not passed is a case in point. In 1396,
capital was influential because ti.neB were hard.
In 1916,

APPIMDIX II.
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LA30R.
capital had loBt a great deal of its political effect,
paradoxically enough, because times were prosperous
'and capital flourishing. It would bo a sorry trade to
gain the capitalist vote on account of capital’s
hostility to the Adamson Law, and lose the laborer’s vote",
— — CIIJCia.iAII afliiUIRSR, Sept. 17, 1916.
Gen. C, M. Spitzer:— "I believe that .Vilaon ia especially
3tr4ng in the industrial centers. He has always favored
labor, and labor is appreciative. He la going to get a big
vote in towns where there are big industrial plants. Of
course, the strength of the farmer vote has been estimated
at oo,j of the total, and that vote is mainly Republican.
Hut what can you tell with oertainty about tho vote in Ohio,
which in the lust few years has almost changed its character
as an aglicultural state
— CIHClIttATl ES£UIP.3R, Oct. 1,1916.
Republican Rational.Publicity Committee Advertisements
Wilson’s
opinion of labor before he entered
politics; Labor's opinion of Hughes after he retired from
polities, -----CISCIIMATI SH^UIHSE, H o t . 2, 1916.
/

"The .resident showed marked strength la every industrial con.
center except Last Liverpool.... He carried by largo plural
ities, Summit, Lahoning, and Stark Counties, each of which
normally i 3 strongly Republican,....Ho ran better than
anticipated in Cuyahoga, i’ranklin, Montgomery, and Luoaa
Counties; and cut the expectedc Republican majority in
Hamilton Countyo in half". — — OHIO STAIR «d!JEHAi»#
Hov. 12, 1916.
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A,

/

"The representatives of the Brotherhoods issued a state
ment at midnight that they vjould not reeoind the strike
order until the eight-hour bill shall have been enacted
into law. It is understood that the statement was made
in answer to another direct request from the White House
for delay” ,
"If Congress oan pass an eight-hour law before next
Saturday midnight, there will be no railway strike,
President Alison, and the leaders in both Houses are
bending every energy to bring about the passage of this law”,
" A H the rest of the Presidents program for the present
has been cast aside,
;¥.G. Lee, President of the Brother
hood of Railway Trainmen, told the oenate Committee on
Interstate Commerce this morning, that if the railroad
employees oould get this law, they would be willing to
arbitrate everything else. Immediately there was a
scurrying of Administration leaders to agree on a law
and Jam it through”,—
"The Morgan Company of Alliance (Ohio) protested against
on eight-hour law on the ground that it will affect other
lines of industry, and objected vigorously to the further
withdrawal of militia from uhio until after the stride
situation oeoomes more settled”.
In a hearing of representatives of railroads, trainmen's
brotherhoods, and shippers, before the Interstate Commerce
Commission
"In the estimation of all affected parties.
Congress alone oan prevent a strike, and the public will
eventually foot the bill for an eight-hour day with ten
hours1 pay",

•--- --- CidCIUtfATI SMiUIRSH, dept. 1, 1916.
3,
Jn Lept# 1, the House passed the Adamson 3111, £39 to 56.
Sixteen Ohio representatives voted for it. res© was the only Ohio
member who voted against the bill.
Longworth, Matthews,
Hearns, Switzer, and Kmerson not voting.
Ayes-— democrats, 163; Republicans, 7o; Socialist, 1.
Roes— Democrats, £; Republicans, 54, Joe Cannon voted
for it.
*--- — — CUiCUilATL £li*3IRXR, Sept. £, 1916.
C.

On Sept. £, the Senate passed the bill, 43 to £3. Harding
absent, fomerene voted for it, explaining "that he voted
for the bill simply to avert a calamity that would press
moat heavily upon the helpless, and not because he thought
that the legislation was mature, or because he thought that
Congress should oe given short shrift and mandatory orders
to pass l e g i s l a t i o n " . t h other senators I agree that
this legislation which is now under consideration does not
fully meet the situation. It is only a temporary measure to
avert a pending calamity. If this were a question involving
only the brotherhoods and the railroads. I could oaks the
view of v/hat
duty is and should bo • (continued)
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C.
(continued)

"It is oald that this situation affecta only 400,000
workmen find the investors in the railroads. Oh no: it
affects tha industries, the lives, and the ooaforta of
100,0UU,000 people". — -CINCINNATI J5Hd.Uini2R,Sept.3,1916.

D*

"Senator Sherman, (111.), charged President .Vllson with
making a "potty polltioal bargain" on the eve of eleotion.
....'.'He pictured Congress legislating while the unions
stand, stop watch in hand, to see that the legislation is
passed on time".---- CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Sept. 3, 1916.

E.

Advertisement by Daniel Dillard, President of the B. 4
0. R. R. j in regard to the threatened strike of the Engin
eers, firemen, Conductors, and Brakemen:
They constitute les3 than l/5 of the employees, but
receive more than 1/4 the wages.
And the eight-hour day, with ten-v-c hours' pay, and
time and a half for overtime; would mean a 30>i increase
in wages: then they would bo receiving more than onethird of the wage3.--- CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Sept. 3, 1916.

F.

"The A.damson Eight-Hour 3111, exacted from Congress
last week by the railroud brothornoods, as the price of
calling off the nation-wide strike ordered for to-morrow,
was signed by President Wilson to-day, (Sunday, Sept.3}
in hiB private car at the Union Station, (Washington,D.C.),
whars ha stopped on hia way from Shadow lawn, N. J., $o
Hodgensvllle, Ky." — — CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Sept .4,1916.

0.

q . Leat President of the Brotherhood of Railroad
Trainmen, issued a bulletin addressed to the 133,162
members of th8 organization, as follows:
"Surely it is the duty of not only our own members, out
of all persons who work for a living, to support our
friends; and if possible, to defeat our enemies at the
coming election. Therefore it is earnestly requested
that the position taken by President Wilson and both
branches of Congress be not forgotten, and that all
members use every honorable means to retain in offloe,
regardless of partisan beliefs, those who have proven
their loyalty to the cause of labor".
_____— CINCINNATI EHvi'JIP.EF., bept, *0, 1916.

43/
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H.

Hughes, at Cleveland, (kept. 26), declared the passage of
the Adamson law the most shocking thing that he had ever
encountered la public life, H& is not opposed to the prin
ciple of the sight-hour la/, uni is only against eveirytliing
that surrenders peaceful pi-ogrees to force.
(,:i*hat about
the Banbury Rattors?", shouted a heokler,).
----- C l U C i m * ! ABiUIRSK, Sept. 27, 1916.

i.

Hughes, at Guyton, (Sept. 25), had denounced the Adamson
Bill aa a blow at both capital and labor, because of the
method and circus stance a under which it had been put
through. ----- Clh'CI.i -ATI 3'J i UiBJJU, Sept. 26, 1 9 1 6 .
At Cleveland and Toledo he continued hla attacks on the
law.— CISC I:*.:ATI SiMRIRATc, Sept. 27, 1916.

k

.

J. >/. F&allcneri "As near as can be cane at, the paramount
ieeue up to Sept. BO, was the eight-hour bill relating to the
hours of labor and the wages paid to railroad hands’1,
------- CISCJ.S::ATI ESlUin-SH, let. 1, 1516.

L.

The Jhio State Republican Committee
Adamson .oaw to the background, and to
forward,
Bovemor -Villia in favor of
----ClHCIU/fATI Sir<TJIH3R, Oct. 3,

M.

"Though made plain and powerfully presented by Hughes, the
presidential candidate, the eight-hour problem has resulted
In a net lone to the Republican cause, thousand b of skilled
workers having beer, alienated because of the impression that
theLr party is opnoeed to this economic principle".
— -CIBCIHKASI .'saiQUIHER, Jet. 9, 1916, Editorial.

I.

lerry S. heath, Republican, announced; "I regard the eighthour law as a very important Bcaooratic asset, nailroaa.
employees are organizing for ffllson and iCarahall. **1®* to
the adoption of the eight-hour law,- u am told that **• r ~?
ovary railroad man.... was opposed to rfilson. 1 found the
tide turning among railroad employees toward M laon at St.
Paul, then at Chicago, in Indiana, aantucky, and OalO .
Heath said that proanarlty invarlabxy caused Indli-erence In
campaigns, and that the voters this y«ar ara P^s p e r o u B .
busy, and apathetic".-- ClHCIB’iATI M
Cot. lo. 1916.

0.

Report froi Indiana that Ho.jhoa^ hostility to the Adamaon
Law waa coating voteo#—
J^'l
Jot*
1916*

P.

decided to relegate the
put the tariff question
Adam a on Law.
1916.

Same report i*rora 'Tost Yii^ginia.^-^CiflCIN

1

1916*
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ft.

J, >V.'PaulJcner: n?he enactment of the Adamson Eight-Hour
has caused the detachment from the Republican Party of
a considerable number of ski.U&d workmen in the railroad
i\ni .kindred trades------c.IHCxniTA'?! 33QJlR3fta T.ov. 5, 1916*
jmtt

R.

S.S.

T.
,

On Aug. 30, 1916, Representative Adamson, Chairman of
the House Coatalttee on Interstate Commerce, introduced an
eight-hour bill which was aooaptable to the President and
to the representatives of the four railroads brotherhoods,
She bill, passed the House, bept. 1. £39 to 56, (70 Repub
licans for, and 3 -bo-aoerato against), and the senate,
Sept. 2, 43 to 26, (2 democrats against, and one Republican
for)", -— 3a'v z s x m A S i o n A s Y3AR b o c k .1916, p, ? u .
ADAMSON LA)?. “The law provided tliat after Jan. 1, 1917,
eight hours uhall, in contracts for labor and service, be
deemed a day's wors, and the measure or standard of a
day's work, for the purpose of reckoning the compensation
of employees engaged in the operation of trains. Opinion
in this country was sharply divided between those who held
that the unions had scared the President and intimidated
the country, and those who held that the President had
taken the best and only possible course under the circum
stances,
Candidate for the Presidency Charles S. Hughes
made an important campaign issue out of the manner of
settlement and th9 importance of preserving the principle
of arbitration".
(The Republicans maintained that it was
not an eight-hour lav/, but a law giving ton hours' pay
for eight hours* work),
-.— SEW IBfiSRflATIdHAL Y3AR BOOK, 1916, page 39.
“Hie first tour through ohic lei Hughes into a collision
that has Jrobably been disastrous. It is his violent
opposition to the Adamson. Light-Hour Law, He is against
It and he said so; mads his statements bluntly plain and
conclusive. He argued ita weaknesses, as he saw them,
with the intensity of a trained lawyer attacking the con
stitutionality of a law to which he was opposed. He may
have made his case from a legal standpoint, ills utteranoe®
may have been flawless from the standpoint of a logician.
But they were poisonous to the ear3 of the organised
labor of the state.
(Continued)
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f.
continued.

These-men read id his oriticisa of the ci^ht-hour law,
the opposition of tho Republican presidential candidate
to the principle of:- tho sifht-hovir day.
in the most
earnest way he explained that that was not tho case,
but it is apparent that in politics most listeners
reason the chart out from statement to conclusion;
and the labor forces still insist that no real friend
of the ci^ht-hour day would oppose an eight-hour law.
Ku 3 h.se, as the head of the party, nsva advised that
trouble would come if he denounced the Adamson Lav? in
Jhio.
Knowing the probable truth of the statement
made to him, he nevertheless went ahead, and his d a s h
with the labor forces at Toledo made his first tour
of tho state more of a liability than an aesetu .
- — C1K73LA3P PlAIfl PEAL SR, Hov. 5, 1316.

APPENDIX IV
THE PROGRESSIVES.
The Maine election of Sept. 11, (victory for Republicans,
electing Governor, £ Senators, and 4 Representatives),
showed the Progressives drifting back in ratio of about 35;?
to the Democrats and 65;i to the Republicans; which ratio,
if maintained in the November election in all the states,
will re-eleot Wilson. --- CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Sept.12,1916.
Straw vote shows that Wilson will receive 30# of the
Progressive votes in Ohio, 40;? in Kentucky, lass than
25j& in Indiana, and ID,? la West Virginia. IBID.,Sept.£4,1916.
Straw Vote.
New York City
New York, outside
of city
Colorado
Connecticut
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Missouri
Nebraska
New Hampshire
New Jersey
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Rhode Island
Vermont
#eat Virginia
Wisconsin

Progressives
going to Wilson.

Progressives
going to Hughes.

23.8/5

73.9/5

28.3
20
35.9
11.8
18.8
11.6
23.9
27.9
21.2
11.4
33.6
22.2
29.5
16.4
26.1
30.5
16.7
30.5
24.4
25.4
25.2
36.1
14.6
13.3

71.7
80
62.8
86.9
81.1
87.6
76.1
72.1
77.3
88.6
63.9
77.8
70.5
83.6
73.9
69.5
81.1
69.5
75.5
74.5
74.8
63.9
35.4
86.7

•••IBID.
Oct.1,1916.

STRAW VOTE: Hughes getting about 77,? of straw vote in
nation.
OHIO: "Polls taken in industrial regions in
southeast part of the state have served to strengthen
former indications of the President s strength with the
laboring classes".--CINCIN <ATI iiKUIIuiR, Oct. 8, 1916.
Straw Vote: in Nebraska: "The hope of the Republicans
lies in their ability to conduct a campaign of education
against the Adamson Davy before Nov. 7".
•
In KANSAS: "The great grain state will pile up a big
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B.
(Con
tinued),

Republican majority. Political leadera of both aides
ha7« long cea3od to speculate as to the result In
Kansas", -- CINCINNATI JSUUIR3R, Cot. £2, 1916.

F.

J. '•?. Faulkneri"Again, the enactment of many of the
planks of tholr 1912 platform Into law by President
Pilson, and the hostility against the extreme con
servatives of the Republican Party who are behing
Hughes, oauned many Progressives from principle to
taxe part on the President's side'’.
-----CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Hov. 6, 1916.

0.

Editorial from TD1EDJ 8IADS, quoted in the
Cincinnati Enquirer of iJov. 14, 1916; and also in the
uhio htate Journal, of Hov. 16, 1916.
"If the Republican Party is ever to become a
dominant force in the nation again, it must learn
from Tuesday's defeat that progressive principles,
progressive polloloa, and progressive representatives
must no longer be denied high plaoe in the party
councils..... No mors striking proof of the correctness
of such an analysis of the rssult need bo evidonoed
than that afforded by Ohio. 2hat state, olaae kin
in geography and every other interest to Illinois
and Indiana and hichigan, and always to be counted
on to follow the oourse of those sister states in
national elections, went Democratic by tremendous odds,
while the three others rolled up Republican pluralities
While Illinois and Miohigan and Indiana were writing
Progressive Republican platforms, and making peace with
the returned Progressive Party, men of the "Old Guard"
in Ohio were going to the limit in reactionary polioies
and stondpat leadership, and forgetting the party's
duty to the country in a determination to punish the
men who had followed Roosevelt In 1912".

H«

Wilson was supported by John M Parker, of Ia ., Amos
Pinchot, of P s ., A r a n d a J. Keney, of Cal., Ida a. Tarbell,
3ainbriiL*e Colby, of H. Y., iiatthew Kale, of auas., and
about fifteen members of the .Progressiva Rational Committee
Dissatisfied Progressives rosolved to put an electoral
ticket in the field in every state where there was still a
Progressive organization, as an aid to bring about Wilson a
W f
re-election. "It was apparent that a considerable
part of the Progressive vote would go to Wilson as against
Hughes",
.^
-----American Year-look, 1916, p. 4u.
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v.

PROSPERITY.
A«

statement of Vanoe McCormick, Chairman of the Democratic
National Committee:
"In the East, K'est, South, and North, the people are
nap..:y and contented. The oountry Is at peace, Prosperity
rules the land as never before. Factories are working to
their limit. The banks, always a barometer of business
conditions, are bulging with deposits. President Silson
has brought peace and. prosperity to the .oountry, and that
is the reason that the American people are for him",
— — CIHCI3.1ATI
Got. 2, 1916.

B.

J. ;l, Faulkner: "The peace plea and the attending
Industrial boom have been effective with workers generally,
especially among those who have been leaning toward
Socialism". -----CI3CI3RATI ENQUIRER, Hov. 5, 1916.

appendix

vi.

THE FARMERS.
A.

J. .¥* Faulkner: "The gladsome Democrats at headquarters
are now figuring that Wilson is going to nako a standoff In
the rural sections with Hughes.
Usually Ohio is about
7G,GoG Republican outside the municipalities. They think
that ha is string with the farmer beoause of keeping the
peace, and because of high prices under his reign. Carrying
this as a basis for their calculations, they fervently hope
to akin Hughes by many thousands, and to pull Cox and
Pomerene through with Wilson, and on his coat-tails".
-----CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Oct. 8, 1916.
,

B.

"As already outlined, the denial of warlike intentions on
the part of Hughes fits into this new order, and the dove
of peace will be uncaged at every gathering, it being
recognised that Silaon is strong with the rural voters ,
because of his paoific policy".
— — CINCINNATI EIMUIRSR, uot. 18, 1916.

C.

"Gne of the first things that disturbed the Republican
State managers wa 3 the discovery that the usually loyal
agricultural sections were becoming permeated with .Kelson
sentiment based upon the peace that he has preaerved. .
___ -CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, UJt. 23, 1916.

B.

J. Vf» Faulkner: "Emphasis upon the peaceful condition
of tna country, and the high prices of agricultural
•
products, has had the effect of attaching ^
Republican
farmers to thd Jeiaocratio candidate «
dov« o f

APPENDIX VII.
the

VOTE .

In KANSAS: Hughes was found to be strong with tha women voters
Hie early pronounced stand in favor of granting them suffrage
has pleased them.
••-CINCINNATI KilQUlRKR, i*ept. £4, 1916.
"Illinois women are strong for President Wilson.....
Observers say that the women are for Wilson because they
credit hia with keeping the country out of war11.
---- CINCINNATI M ’
<UIM£Rt Oct. l f 1916.
" Democrats say that the women have been their most
important ally....,The President’s peace policy has
won them more than prosperity, tho eight-hour day, or
any other consideration".
~ ..CMCIiTvATI EUttirjSH, Rov.1,1916.
Senator Harding said: "Governor Hughes came out sauarely
for the Federal Amendment for woman’s suffrage, and was
then defeated by tha vote of women in large part. There
can be no doubt about the women’s votes of Kansas, Utah,
and California changing the complexion of those normally
Republicsn States. Of course the radical labor vote of
California helped the president to carry that State, but
the women’s votes made the balance which turned the scale.
Without comment on the merits of the woman’s suffrage
question itself, we venture to record the opinion that
Governor Hughes’s declaration had not a little to do with
the adverse result in Ohio. There is a large vote in Ohio
which worships no God save alcohol. It fears universal
suffrage as an enemy to its cause, and it was hostile to
Governor Hughes from the day of his declaration".
-CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, llov. 11, 1916.
"Of all the suffrage states west of the Mississippi,
only one, Oregon, declared for Hughes”•
Cl e v e l a n d p l a i n d e a l e r , aov. u v .1916»

ADPMDLI VIII
LOYALTf OF Q3B&A3 A&KRI C ASS .
„ Governor A. 0. Stanley of Kentucky, in a speech at Frankfort,
- y •> at v/onvantion of jeriaan—American Alliance t
"Kentucky has no better citizens and more loyal and liberty*
loving than the Tarmac-Americansn.
Attorney A. A» Bablitz: "Attempts have boon made to discredit
the attitude of Gexinan-Amerioang generally,,,,Shat theaa attacks
have not done greater damage is due to the fact that the un- •
biaaaed citizens of this country are too well acquainted with
the general character and loyally of the German-Aroerioan citi
zens to accept each scurrilous attacks at their face value.
iVe are not unmindful of the good services rendered the
German-Aaerioan citizens by well-disposed statesmen like cur
own 0. S. Senator Jllie James, who have protested against
£hese senseless attacks and advised against them. Should
the day evoi* cot,e when a chapter of American history must
be written wherein manly valor and loyalty to the flag will
os tooted, I call on you German-Aaerioans of Kentucky to
witness that we will prove as good examples to those who
now traduce and offend us by their senseless talk as those
German-Americana whose names and deeds are inseparably
linked with the history of the Suited States".
------- C1NCIHHAJI BHJiSIRiSB, Kept. 4, 1916.
"Theodore Roosevelt will bo forbidden to appear upon the
stump in the buckeye State, At a meeting of Republicans in
Cincinnati, l>ept. Id, National Committeeman R. R, Hynioka
being present, it was intimated that if the Colonel wers to
be invited into the Ohio campaign, many Geraan-AcsoricanB
would consider such action of sufficient enormity to Justify
them in casting their vota against the candidacy of hughes" •
— — — CLICIJJAATI SIJ-.IUIP.3R, Sept. 12, 1916.
STRAJ? VOTE: "Results so far have not borne out the prediction
that the President would lose heavily in the strong OeraanAmerican centers, Cincinnati and Hamilton, two ohio cities
noted for their laTge percentage of German-Amerioan population,
have furnished strong proof of this fact",
"The majority of the votes counted to the present time were
cast la Cincinnati, a Republican city and a Canaan-American
center. Despite the fact that Hughez lias been the gainer in
the exchange of votes both among progressives and members o*.
the twe leading political partisef the *resident a showing
in Cincinnati lias been a surprise alike to the Republican
and Democratic leaders.".
x
^ ..
.
,
“It was freely predicted at tne outset of t.*e campaign that
Busk... beoaua. of turn
toward the irealdont, would pile up a cmjority in Cincinna
that would remove the State'from the doubtfux cSlu^a. i.*e
prediction has not been borne out by the results of the two-

weeks' canvass".
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LOYALTY OF GERMAN AMERICANS.
C.
(con
tinued) «

D.

IN KANSAS: "It has boon found that the German-American
voters, including those in the second and third genera
tions, are practically solid against Wilson, They say
that they are offended by hia statement hinting that
the Genaand were disloyal. The German-American rote
in Eastern Kansas has been largely Democratic because
of the Kansas prohibitory law,:.
------CINCINNATI ENiOIRSR, Sept. 24, 1916.
"Nebraska reports show that what Wilson will gain
because of the Adamson Law, he will lose among voters
of German extraction".
---------CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Get. 1 , 1916.

E.

Statement by the Ohio State Democratic Committee:
"Reports from all sections indicate that the GerxaanAmericans have come to a realization of what President
ViIson has done for all American citizens. They are
thankful for peace, especially for peace with the Fatherland. They fear the results of a change of presidents,
especially if one be elected who makes as his Secretary
of V»'ar Theodore Roosevelt and his Secretary of State
Elihu Root. They also fear that war would result in
conscription, and that their sons // and heads of families
would be drafted for service, possibly against the re
lations who still hold allegiance in the Fatherland.
They realize that a political play has been made upon
their loyalty". — — CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Get. 2, 1916.

T.

Statement from 67 citizens of Knox County, Ohio, of
German parentage:
"We....wish to voice our approval of President Woodrow
Wilson fs method of avoiding war with any foreign power,
and wish to thank him for our present peace and prosper
ity..... We feel that Hughes could have done no better,
and may have done worse....Therefore we ask all who
sympathize with the Fatherland to support our President .
•--------CINCINNATI ENQUIRER. Oct. 6, 1916.
J. V. Faulkner: "Recognizing that Cincinnati and
iamilton County is the darkest Africa of their map,
;hey have resolved to make a hard fight to hold down
;he Republican plurality. There is a large Germaniinerican peculation which is sore on Wilson for his
foreign policy, dnd on Cox for that part of the liquor—
.icensing system that caused the saloons to close on

>unday".

CISCIHilAlI EHiUlRSB,

Oct. 8, 1918.

Aggjsnjix

viii

LOYALTY OF GERMAN A'SERICANS
More than 1^0 German-American Trotestant ministers met
in Cincinnati, (Oct# 24), and. adopted resolutions con
demning A'ilson’s weak protests against England’s treat
ment of our commerce, while not endeavoring to Keep up
commerce with Germany; and therefore resolved to support
Hughes#
------CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Oct# 25, 1916.
Cincinnati:— "As was feared by the democrats, they fared
badly in the German wards# They carried one precinct each
in the loth and 11th wards; and the 20th ward gave Vilson
a little more than 8 j u , when the normal majority is 1200".
— -- CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Nov. 9, 1916.
y# A. Julian:— "The German-Americans of Ohio were united
against *«ilson at the start of the campaign, but they were
largely split by Wilson’s and Roosevelt’s speeches, until
they came to our side in large numbers#.#..Speaking gener
ally, of those who are called German-Americans, those of
German birth followed the lead of the German language
newspapers and voted against vTilson. Those of German
parentage or descent, but born in this country, and who
read and speak English, broke away and voted as they
thought, a very large proportion of them for Wilson.
Not a single German paper of Ohio was on our side".
------- CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Nov. 14, 1916.
"So far as Columbus is concerned, at least, the German
citizens were loyal to America in the casting of their
votes on election day. The wards of the city
which
the bulk of the German-Americans live went democratic as
usual".
(This may have be-?n due to their wet proclivities;
•— -OHIO STATE JOURNAL, Nov. l2, 1916*
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APPENDIX IX.
THE

"HYPHEN".

Roosevelt spoke in stern reprobation of the professional
German-American element in American politics, the element
typified by the German-American Alliances and the similar
bodies which had in the pre-nomination campaign played "not
merely an un-American but a thoroly anti-American part"*
"These elements", he said, "had favored Hughes for the
nomination not because of any liking for Hughes, but
because of their antagonism to Roosevelt". Ho good American,
whatever his ancestry or creed, can have any feeling except
scorn and detestation for those professional German—Americans
who seek to make the American President in effect a viceroy
of the German Emperor.
The professional German— Americans
of this type are acting purely in the sinister interest of
Germany. They have shown their eager readiness to sacrifice
the interests of the United States whenever its interest^
conflicted with that of Germany. They represent that ad
herence to the politico-racial hyphen which is the badge
and sign of moral treason to the Republic".
Roosevelt
earnestly urged his fellow-progressives to give their
ungrudging support to Hughes.
"Hughes promptly expressed to Roosevelt his appreciation
of this endorsement. He recognized the debt of the nation to
Roosevelt for "the quickening of the national spirit and the
demand of an out-and-out Americanism, and for the insistence
upon the immediate necessity of a thoro-going preparedness,
spiritual, military , and economio* To this end Hughes
appealed for a united party reconsecrated to its loftiest
ideal. He and Roosevelt were in entire accord: "You have
sounded forth the trumpet that shall never call retreat.
And I want you to feel that I wish to have all the aid
that you are able and willing to give. I want the
4
effective co-operation with all those who have been fighting
by your side. Let us work together for our national security,
and for the peace of righteousness and Justice".
UoteJ.
— -AFRICAN YEAR-BOOK, 1916, p. 33.
Hote---An appeal f o r P ro g re s s iv e s u p p o rt, bu* i * ai u f +d r
from him the German vote of those who were afraid that
Roosevelt would, control the new administration, and thus
hasten war between the United States and Germany.
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rjrasTioaaAiRa
( Submitted to i)olitical authorities in the various counties
especially chairmen of the Hepublican and •democratic
county committees)*
On the Presidential Campaign of 1916 in uhio, ( ;vhy it went
as it did), I would like to have y^ur opinion on the following
questions:
1*

Was your county normally Republican or Democratic?

2*

What particular issues were stressed In your county?

3.

What was the attitude

of labor in your county?

4.

What was the attitude

of the business znan?

5*

.Vhat was the attitude

of the farmer?

6.

What was the attitude

of the intellectuals?

7.

8.
9#
10.
11.

If there are any definite nationality elements in your
county, what were their respective attitudes; whether
foreign-born, or .American-born still conscious of their
ancestry?
How did the Progressives of 1912 vote in 1916?
Did the voters make a distinction between the National
ticket and the State ticket; and why?
Did local county issues influence the voters in regard
to the national ticket?
Which had more to do with changing a voterfs attitude;
the Adamson Act, or the slogan, "He kept Is out if war ?

X f you w is h t o ans./er more a t le iig th th a n th e space a llo w s
f o r , p le a s e w r it e on the back o f t h i s s h e e t.

